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Living Wills: How Legal Entity Rationalization 
Addresses the “Too Big to Fail” Problem 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Regulations implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) resolution plan 
requirement—commonly referred to as “living will” requirement—were 
finalized just over five years ago by the Federal Reserve Board (the 
“Fed”) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”) 
(collectively, the “Agencies”).1 The living will requirement is  one 
device in an arsenal of regulatory provisions designed to solve the “too 
big to fail” (“TBTF”) problem.2 A financial institution is considered 
TBTF if the government would be compelled to intervene to prevent it 
from failing because such failure would devastate the economy.3 The 
living will requirement aims to address TBTF by requiring “covered 
companies”4 to design and implement procedures that would allow the 
company to execute a “rapid and orderly resolution”5 in the event of 
material financial distress or failure.6  If a living will does not reflect the 
 
1. Resolution Plans Required, 26 Fed. Reg. 67323, 67323 (Nov. 1, 2011) (codified at 
12 C.F.R. pt. 243). 
2. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, §1, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) (listing the goal to end TBTF as one of the 
purposes for the Act). 
3. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-341, RESOLUTION PLANS: 
REGULATORS HAVE REFINED THEIR REVIEW PROCESSES BUT COULD IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY 
AND TIMELINESS 2 n.5 (2016) [hereinafter GAO-16-341], http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/ 
676497.pdf (defining TBTF as “a market notion that the federal government would  
intervene to prevent the failure of a systemically important financial institution (“SIFI”) to 
avoid harm to the economy”). 
4. See Resolution Plans, 12 C.F.R. § 243.2(f) (2016) (defining each nonbank financial 
company supervised by the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors and each bank 
holding company with $50 billion or more total consolidated assets as a “covered 
company”). 
5. See Resolution Plans Required, 26 Fed. Reg. at 67327 (defining a rapid and orderly 
resolution as a resolution that can be completed in a reasonable period of time and that 
“substantially mitigates the risk that the failure of the company would have serious adverse 
effects on financial stability in the United States”). 
6. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. & FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
RESOLUTION   PLAN   ASSESSMENT   FRAMEWORK    AND   FIRM   DETERMINATIONS   5 (2016) 
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ability of the company to proceed through an orderly resolution, the 
Agencies will deem the plan “not credible.”7 
The eight largest bank holding companies in the nation—JP 
Morgan Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley, State Street Corp., Wells Fargo, 
Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Bank of New York Mellon, and Bank of 
America—received the results of their 2015 living will submissions in 
April 2016.8 The Agencies found deficiencies in five of the eight living 
wills and concluded that those plans were not credible.9 Two banks 
received split decisions on credibility, and Citigroup was the only bank 
to pass muster under the prescribed criteria.10 After three annual 
submission-and-review cycles since 2012, it has become clear that the 
nation’s largest banks are still TBTF.11 
Due to the perceived lack of progress toward creating credible 
plans, critics are calling on the Agencies to use the authority granted to 
them under Dodd-Frank to apply more restrictive prudential 
requirements12 to the companies whose plans are not credible.13 In 
response, the Agencies announced that banks that failed to remedy 
deficiencies in their 2015 living wills by October 2016 would be subject 
to  “more  stringent  capital,  leverage,  or  liquidity  requirements  or 
 
[hereinafter FRAMEWORK AND DETERMINATIONS] (stating that the goal of resolution is to 
make sure that failure of a bank holding company doesn’t have seriously adverse effects on 
financial stability in the United States). 
7. See Resolution Plans Required, 26 Fed. Reg. at 67325. 
8. FRAMEWORK AND DETERMINATIONS, supra note 6, at 13. 
9. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Agencies Announce 
Determinations and Provide Feedback on Resolution Plans of Eight Systemically Important, 
Domestic Banking Institutions (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
press/bcreg/20160413a.htm. 
10. DELOITTE, PEELING BACK THE 2017 RESOLUTION PLAN GUIDANCE 4 (2016), https:// 
www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/regulatory/us-regulatory- 
resolution-plan-guidance.pdf. 
11. Thomas M. Hoenig, Vice Chairman, F.D.I.C., Bd. Meeting Statement (Apr. 13, 
2016), https//www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spapr1316a.html (concluding that “the  
goal to end too big to fail and protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts remains just 
that: only a goal”). 
12. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) 
§165(d), 12 U.S.C §5365(d)(5)(A) (authorizing the Agencies to subject firms that fail to 
submit credible plans to more stringent capital, leverage, or liquidity requirements, or 
restrictions on the growth, activities, or operations of the company, or any  subsidiary 
thereof, until such time as the company resubmits a plan that remedies the deficiencies). 
13. Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator, Donnelly, Warren Encourage Fed, 
FDIC to Consider All Statutory Tools if Banks’ Living Wills Are Found Not Credible (June 
20,     2016)     [hereinafter     Warren     Press     Release],   https://www.warren.senate.gov/ 
?p=press_release&id=1162. 
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restrictions on growth, activities, or operations.”14 Then, in December 
2016, the Agencies subjected Wells Fargo to various limitations on 
future growth after the company failed to address its living will 
deficiencies in an updated submission.15 
Though a majority of the nation’s largest banks are not fully 
prepared for orderly resolution, the living wills process has yielded 
demonstrable progress toward remedying TBTF.16 Banks have been 
forced to simplify organizational structure and operations in their efforts 
to pass the Agencies’ review.17 The examination of one section of the 
living wills—legal entity rationalization (“LER”)—illustrates the 
progress made to date and highlights the potential improvements in  
bank safety and soundness that the living will requirement will provide 
going forward. 
LER requires firms to organize and align material entities with 
critical operations and core business lines in order to address one of the 
most hazardous aspects of TBTF: complexity.18 LER is just one part of 
the living will evaluation process, but the significant improvements that 
banks have made in this area exemplify the efficacy of the living will 
requirement. Consequently, this Note concludes that the Agencies 
should remain conservative in applying stringent prudential 
requirements to the banks for two reasons. First, the living will 
submission and review process has had a significant impact on  the 
TBTF problem, and second, further regulatory constraints may increase 
the risk of market harm.19 
 
14. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 9. 
15. See infra Part II. 
16. See e.g., Letter from Bd. of Governors of the Federal Reserve System & F.D.I.C to 
Gerald Hassell, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of The Bank of New York Mellon 
Corp. 10 (Apr. 12, 2016) [hereinafter BNYM 2016 Letter] (listing steps taken by Bank of 
New York Mellon to become resolvable without government aid). 
17. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF SIZE AND 
COMPLEXITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON CAPITAL MARKET EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 25 (2016) [hereinafter SIZE AND COMPLEXITY] (stating that firms have explored 
ways to streamline and simplify organizational structures through resolution planning 
process). 
18. See Hal S. Scott, Interconnectedness and Contagion 5–19 (2012) [hereinafter 
INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION], https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/- 
interconnectedness-and-contagion-by-hal-scott_153927406281.pdf (listing size, 
interconnectedness, and complexity as features that warrant the designation of a large 
financial institution as systemically important). 
19. See Natasha Sarin & Lawrence Summers, Have Big Banks Gotten Safer?, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 27), https:// 
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This Note proceeds in five parts.  Part II provides an overview 
of the living will requirement, describes the review process that the 
Agencies use to make their credibility determinations, and explains the 
LER section of the living will.20 Part III analyzes how the LER process 
has enabled the simplification of bank structure and operations, thereby 
resolving many of the complexity problems.21 Part IV compares the 
likely effects, advantages, and drawbacks of subjecting the covered 
companies to more restrictive prudential requirements when their living 
wills do not pass the Agencies’ scrutiny.22 Part V concludes by 
emphasizing the effectiveness of the living will requirement and 
cautions against the enforcement of more stringent prudential 
requirements at this stage in the regulation’s evolution.23 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF LIVING WILLS AND LEGAL ENTITY RATIONALIZATION 
 
A. Requirements and Review Process 
 
Bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of $50 
billion or more and nonbank financial companies designated by the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (the “FSOC”) for supervision by 
the Fed are required to submit living wills annually.24 The Agencies set 
three yearly due dates staggered by the asset size of the banking entity.25 
The first group includes any company with $250 billion or more in total 
nonbank assets.”26 The eight largest bank holding companies—Bank of 
America, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan & Chase, State Street Bank, Bank of 
New York Mellon, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Citigroup— 
are first wave filers.27 Each living will must include  a  “narrative” 
section  that  contains  detailed  analyses  of  strategies  and  processes 
 
 
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2_sarinsummers.pdf (discussing impact of 
bank regulatory actions on national market). 
20. See infra Part II. 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. See infra Part IV. 
23. See infra Part V. 
24.    Resolution Plans, 12 C.F.R. § 243.2(f) (2016). 
25.    Id. § 243.3(a). 
26.    Id. §243.3(a)(1). 
27. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SR 14-8, CONSOLIDATED RECOVERY 
PLANNING FOR CERTAIN LARGE DOMESTIC BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 1 (Sept. 25, 2014) 
[hereinafter SR 14-8]. 
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targeted to address the key areas of concern identified by the Agencies 
as vital to an orderly resolution.28 
The FDIC has a resolution plan requirement, separate from the 
Dodd-Frank living will mandate, that applies to insured depository 
institutions only.29 The FDIC rule requires insured  depository 
institutions with $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets to 
develop living wills that will facilitate resolution under the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act.30 The FDIC requirement  is  intended  to 
coordinate the resolution of an insured depository institution and its 
parent holding company, allowing covered firms to submit a 
consolidated report sufficient to satisfy both laws.31 
Further, the Dodd-Frank living will requirement will be used as  
a planning tool to allow the FDIC to exercise its power under  the 
Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”) efficiently.32 Previously, the 
FDIC only had authority to resolve insured depository institutions, but 
Dodd-Frank created the OLA to give the FDIC authority to resolve a 
systemically important nonbank financial institution that has failed.33 
The Government Accountability Office (the “GAO”) published 
a report to provide insight into the living will review process conducted 
by the Agencies.34 First, each plan is subject to a  completeness,  
vertical, and horizontal review.35 The completeness review is a two- 
week process during which regulators use checklists to verify that all 
required documentation and basic information have been submitted by 
 
 
28. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. & BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
GUIDANCE FOR 2017 §165(d) ANNUAL RESOLUTION PLAN SUBMISSIONS BY DOMESTIC 
COVERED COMPANIES THAT SUBMITTED RESOLUTION PLANS IN JULY 2015  2  (2016) 
[hereinafter GUIDANCE 2017], https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/ 
bcreg20160413a1.pdf (outlining six key areas of concern: capital, liquidity, governance, 
operations, derivatives and trading, and legal entity rationalization). 
29. Resolution Plan Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67323, 67329 (Nov. 1, 2011) (codified at 
12 C.F.R. pt 243). 
30. Id. 
31. See e.g., CITIGROUP, 2014 RESOLUTION PLAN FOR CITIGROUP INC. & CITIBANK, N.A. 
1 (June 20, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/citigroup- 
1g-20140701.pdf (titling document as §165(d) and IDI Resolution Plan). 
32. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings  
Inc. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 5 FDIC QUARTERLY no. 2, 2011, at 41 (describing how 
resolution plan would have provided insight required to plan orderly resolution of Lehman 
Brothers Holdings). 
33. Id. at 31. 
34. GAO-16-341, supra note 3. 
35. GAO-16-341, supra note 3. 
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each company.36 The vertical review identifies shortcomings and 
deficiencies in an individual company’s living will, and the horizontal 
review tracks issues that arise across all living wills.37 Following each 
review, regulators prepare summaries of each living will, which are 
reviewed at a higher level by both the Oversight Group38 and the 
Resolution Plan Vetting Committees39 at the FDIC and the Fed 
respectively.40 Finally, the Board of Directors for the FDIC and the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors vote on the credibility of plans, 
using the summaries prepared by regulators.41 
The GAO report included two areas of concern and 
recommendations for the Agencies to consider, the first of which 
addressed the lack of transparency in the credibility determination 
process.42 The GAO suggested that the Agencies release the framework 
used to make decisions about the adequacy of living will submissions.43 
In response to this feedback, the Agencies released a public document 
with a list of the major parts of the plans and a short explanation of what 
each part requires. However, no framework for determining credibility 
has been released.44 
 
B. Results of Past Submissions 
 
As projected, the living wills process has been an iterative one, 
which has allowed the banks to improve their plans by implementing 
tailored feedback.45 To achieve this, the Agencies required first wave 
filers to submit initial plans by July 1, 2012.46  The Fed made it clear 
 
36. GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 18. 
37. See GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 18–19 (describing vertical review as a firm 
specific review which identifies “issues, shortcomings, and obstacles to resolvability” and 
horizontal review identifies key issues across all plans which informs general guidance). 
38. An interdivisional group of senior executives that directs review of staff-level 
shortcomings and recommends findings to the FDIC Board of Directors. GAO-16-341, 
supra note 3, at 20. 
39. See GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 20 (describing the Fed’s Resolution Plan Vetting 
Committee which performs same tasks as FDIC’s Oversight Group). 
40. GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 20. 
41.   GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 20–21. 
42.   GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 56–57. 
43.   GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 56–57. 
44. FRAMEWORK AND DETERMINATIONS, supra note 6. 
45. See FRAMEWORK AND DETERMINATIONS, supra note 6, at 13 (“The resolution plan 
rule established an iterative process . . . .”). 
46. See Resolution Plan Required, 12 C.F.R. § 243.3(a)(i) (2016) (setting July 2012 
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that it would issue individualized advice to help improve each 
company’s structure and operations based upon the first plan in order to 
provide guidance and direction for future submissions.47 Accordingly, 
the companies’ 2012 submissions were not evaluated for credibility.48 
Instead, the Agencies completed a horizontal review and released a 
guidance document with specific instructions, including key 
considerations that each firm should address in the narrative section of 
subsequent plans.49 
Despite overall improvements in the 2013 living will 
submissions, the Agencies’ reviews—which were not released until 
August 2014—noted deficiencies in each company’s plan.50 The Fed 
determined that each bank had shortcomings that should be addressed, 
while the FDIC felt that the deficiencies were enough to deem the plans 
not credible.51 The law dictates that both the FDIC and the Fed agree 
before a credibility determination prevails, therefore the banks received 
another opportunity to satisfy the living will requirements.52 The 
Agencies provided feedback for the banks to use while preparing their 
July 2015 living wills.53 In addition, staff at both Agencies were 
available to answer questions related to living will preparation.54 
The iterative nature of the living wills process has allowed the 
 
 
due date for any covered company that has $250 billion or more in total nonbank assets). 
47. See GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 9–10 (“The Board of Governors noted that . . . 
the initial resolution plans would provide the foundation for developing more robust plans 
over the next few years.”). 
48. But see Hal Scott, The Mystery of ‘Living Will’ Rules for Banks, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 
3, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hal-scott-the-mystery-of-living-will-rules-for-banks- 
1409786558 (asserting that the Agencies undermine the living will process by failing to 
provide clear guidance on how to achieve credibility). 
49. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. & BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
GUIDANCE FOR 2013 §165(d) ANNUAL RESOLUTION PLAN SUBMISSIONS BY DOMESTIC 
COVERED COMPANIES THAT SUBMITTED INITIAL RESOLUTION PLANS IN 2012 1 (2013) 
[hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR 2013], https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/ 
bcreg20130415c2.pdf. 
50. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. & Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., Agencies Provide Feedback on Second Round Resolution Plans of “First-Wave” Filers 
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20140805a.htm. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Letter from Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & the Fed. Deposit Ins. 
Corp. to Lloyd Blankfein, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer of The Goldman Sachs Group, 
Inc. 3 (Apr. 12, 2016) [hereinafter GS 2016 Letter], https://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/press/bcreg/goldman-sachs-letter-20160413.pdf. 
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Agencies to take an active role in shaping each bank’s recovery and 
resolution process.55  Between the guidance issued in 2013 and 2016,  
the Agencies refined the focus of their assessments56 and identified six 
key areas of concern that each company must thoroughly address: 
capital, liquidity, governance, operations, derivatives and trading 
activities, and LER.57 Though earlier feedback emphasized quality and 
scope of living wills, more recent feedback has focused on changes that 
companies have made or failed to make in the six main areas.58 While 
attentiveness to each area of concern is vital to an orderly resolution, 
LER addresses the heart of TBTF, namely, the size and complexity 
arising from the organizational structure of an institution.59 
 
C. Legal Entity Rationalization 
 
LER is described by the Agencies as the process of simplifying 
the legal entity structure of a corporation in a way that facilitates a rapid 
and orderly resolution.60 The process involves four main tasks: 
developing resolution-focused LER criteria, establishing a governance 
procedure to realign current material entities in accordance with those 
criteria, ensuring ongoing adherence to LER criteria, and devising plans 
to enable separate resolution for each material entity in a bank’s 
structure.61 LER criteria are guidelines used to simplify the hierarchy of 
material entities, and to align those entities with critical operations and 
core business lines in a way that best meets the needs of a firm’s 
resolution strategy.62  To meet the Agencies’ expectations, LER criteria 
 
 
55. ARANTXA JARQUE & DAVID A. PRICE, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF  RICHMOND, 
LIVING WILLS: A TOOL FOR CURBING TOO BIG TO FAIL 4, 9 (2014), https:// 
www.richmondfed.org/-/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/annual_report/2014/ 
pdf/ar.pdf. 
56. GAO-16-341, supra note 36. 
57. FRAMEWORK AND DETERMINATIONS, supra note 17, at 10. 
58. PWC, FIRST TAKE, TEN KEY POINTS FROM REGULATORS’ FEEDBACK TO WAVE 1 
RESOLUTION PLAN FILERS 2 (2014), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/regulatory- 
services/publications/assets/first-take-dodd-frank-act-resolution-planning.pdf. 
59. See ARANTXA JARQUE & DAVID A. PRICE, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND, 
LIVING WILLS FOR SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: SOME EXPECTED 
BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES 3 (2015) (describing the relationship between large institutions 
and complexities involved with their resolution). 
60. FRAMEWORK AND DETERMINATIONS, supra note 6, at 10. 
61. GUIDANCE 2017, supra note 28. 
62. See FRAMEWORK AND DETERMINATIONS, supra note 6, at 1. 
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must be clear, actionable, and focused on resolution considerations.63 
Resolution-focused criteria will enable: (1)  recapitalization  and 
liquidity support of material entities; (2) provide for the sale, transfer, or 
wind-down of discrete operations; (3) prioritize protection of all insured 
depository institutions; and (4) ensure minimal complexity throughout 
the firm’s hierarchy.64 
After designing LER criteria sufficient to meet their resolution 
goals, banks must establish a governance process to apply the criteria to 
their current holding company structure and to ensure  ongoing 
adherence to them.65 This means that firms must implement their LER 
criteria to simplify and prepare the existing corporate structure for 
resolution,66 and they must consult their LER criteria as they grow or 
decide to add new business lines.67 The Agencies emphasized how vital 
it is that business-as-usual (profit-focused)  considerations,  which 
usually motivate decisions to expand activities or add new entities, do 
not eclipse the consideration of LER and orderly resolution.68 
In addition to bringing the corporate structure into alignment 
with LER criteria, the banks must develop options to sell or transfer 
material entities and business lines in a piecemeal fashion.69 To 
accomplish this, the bank must identify all material entities70 and detail 
 
 
 
63. Letter from Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & the Fed. Deposit Ins. 
Corp. to James Dimon, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer of JP Morgan Chase & Co. 19 
(Apr. 12, 2016) [hereinafter JP Morgan Chase 2016 Letter]. 
64. See GUIDANCE 2017, supra note 28, at 10 (setting out list of priorities that LER 
criteria should achieve when applied to a corporation’s structure and activities). 
65. See GUIDANCE 2017, supra note 28, at 20 (“[T]he plan should include a description 
of the firm’s legal entity rationalization governance process.”). 
66. See BNYM 2016 Letter, supra note 16, at 10 (discussing how firms are expected to 
evaluate their legal entity structures against their rationalization criteria and make 
appropriate adjustments and thereby implement their criteria). 
67. See Letter from Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & the Fed. Deposit Ins. 
Corp. to John Stumpf, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer of Wells Fargo & Co. 8 (Apr. 12, 
2016) [hereinafter WF 2016 Letter], https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/ 
bcreg/wells-fargo-letter-20160413.pdf 
(emphasizing that application of LER criteria should allow firm to prioritize resolution 
when determining which projects to undertake). 
68. Id. 
69. See GUIDANCE 2017, supra note 28, at 14 (“The firm should identify discrete 
operations that could be sold or transferred in resolution.”). 
70. See GUIDANCE FOR 2013, supra note 49, at 10 (“Material entities should encompass 
those entities, including foreign offices and branches, that are significant to the maintenance 
of a critical operation or core business line.”). 
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how critical operations71 are supported by each.72 Further, the 
interconnections and shared services between each material entity must 
be mapped along with a plan to address disruptions of shared services 
caused by any sale or transfer that would impact multiple entities.73 The 
goal of separability is to enable a firm to wind down activities of a  
failed company without any negative impact on the stability of any 
solvent material entities or critical operations that remain.74 
The Fed placed additional emphasis on the separability facet of 
LER in the context of recovery planning in a 2014 supervisory letter 
directed to the eight largest banks.75 Recovery planning is distinct from 
resolution planning in that it enables a bank to respond to financial 
catastrophes by taking actions to stabilize the firm and prevent it from 
failing.76 The separability options devised for resolution should be 
supported by the same analysis required for recovery planning.77 This 
means that the living will should discuss mitigating actions for all 
relevant obstacles to the sale or transfer of significant assets or legal 
entities.78 Examples of possible impediments include: interconnectivity 
among operations that may suffer interruption during the sale of a legal 
entity, market conditions that might affect availability of buyers  or 
going concern value of assets, or tax and regulatory consequences 
connected to the sale, transfer, or wind-down of an entity.79 
Banks that carefully incorporated agency guidelines for 
establishing LER criteria and implementation received a favorable 
assessment  for  this  portion  of  their  2015  plans.80    For  example, 
 
71. See GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 14–21 (referencing the final rule which defines 
critical operations as “the operations of a company for which the failure or discontinuance 
would pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States”). 
72. GUIDANCE FOR 2013, supra note 49, at 4. 
73. GUIDANCE FOR 2013, supra note 49, at 12. 
74. GUIDANCE FOR 2013, supra note 49, at 4. 
75. SR 14-8, supra note 26, at 1. 
76. SR 14-8, supra note 26, at 1. 
77. See GUIDANCE 2017, supra note 28, at 19 (“[T]he plan should include a description 
of the firm’s legal entity rationalization governance process.”). 
78. SR 14-8, supra note 27, at 1. 
79. SR 14-8, supra note 27, at 1. 
80. See, e.g,. Letter from Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & the F.D.I.C to 
James Gorman, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer of Morgan Stanley 5 (Apr. 14, 2016) 
[hereinafter MS 2016 Letter], https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/ 
morgan-stanley-letter-20160413.pdf (acknowledging Morgan Stanley for developing 
specific LER criteria which focus on resolvability of the firm, reducing number of legal 
entities, separating and simplifying structure of operations). 
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Citigroup received commendation for developing specific LER criteria, 
identifying discrete objects to sell, and reducing its asset size.81 Further, 
Citigroup reduced its number of business lines, thereby reducing its  
total number of legal  entities by  40%.82  The firm also plans to  reduce 
its number of legal entities by an additional 25% before the July 2017 
living will submission.83 Accordingly, the Agencies did not find any 
deficiencies or shortcomings in this area of Citigroup’s submission.84 
On the other hand, firms that did not design specific, actionable 
LER criteria, failed to implement their criteria, or did not adequately 
describe the governance process for continued adherence to LER, 
received poor reviews from the Agencies.85 For example, Wells Fargo 
was tasked with redesigning its LER criteria because the previous 
criteria prioritized business-as-usual concerns, such as tax advantages 
and regulatory arbitrage, over resolvability considerations.86 In addition 
to rethinking LER criteria, the Agencies directed the bank to set out the 
governance process it will use to ensure that the criteria are applied on 
an ongoing basis.87 This illustrates that the living will process is much 
more than a “fig leaf for TBTF.”88 To the contrary, the regulators fully 
expect the banks to make all changes necessary to bring operations in 
line with their chosen resolution strategy. 
Wells Fargo received another opportunity to demonstrate that it 
had progressed and cured the LER deficiencies in its October 2016 
living will submission.89 In the public portion of its latest submission,  
the bank reported the development of clear, actionable, resolution- 
focused  LER  criteria  with  accompanying  rationale  and  application 
 
 
81. Letter from Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & the F.D.I.C to Michael 
O’Neill, Chairman, and Michael Corbat, Chief Exec. Officer of Citigroup Inc. 4 (Apr. 12, 
2016) [hereinafter Citigroup 2016 Letter], https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
press/bcreg/citi-letter-20160413.pdf. 
82. CITIGROUP, CITIGROUP INC. RESOLUTION PLAN PUBLIC SECTION, 19 (July 1, 2015), 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/plans/citi-165-1507.pdf. 
83. Id. 
84. Citigroup 2016 Letter, supra note 81, at 4. 
85. WF 2016 Letter, supra note 67, at 8. 
86. WF 2016 Letter, supra note 67, at 8. 
87. WF 2016 Letter, supra note 67, at 8. 
88. Barbara A. Rehm, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Curious Bequest: The Living Will, AM. 
BANKER (Sept. 23, 2010) (asserting that the living will requirement is nothing more than a 
fig leaf for TBTF). 
89. See WF 2016 Letter, supra note 67, at 9 (listing actions that Wells Fargo must 
complete before October 2016 submission to remedy deficiencies). 
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protocols for each.90 Wells Fargo used external industry experts in 
addition to an internal workgroup staffed with subject matter experts to 
review the bank’s LER criteria.91 To address the deficiency in its LER 
governance process, the firm created several procedures and new 
practices.92 One of these is an application protocol to be used to help 
management apply the LER criteria on an ongoing basis.93 Another 
notable improvement was the event-driven legal entity assessment 
decision tree, which describes the process to be used when making 
decisions that will affect the corporate structure.94 The decision tree 
includes a list of business decisions—such as mergers or acquisitions, 
new products, or geographic expansion—that might trigger the need for 
assessment.95 
The Agencies determined that the aforementioned procedures 
and processes did not adequately address the LER deficiencies found in 
Wells Fargo’s 2015 living will, and the redesigned LER criteria failed  
to address specific obstacles to resolution in connection with the firm’s 
resolution strategy.96 The examples provided in the event-driven legal 
entity assessment decision tree were deemed inadequate because they 
did not include precise actions that management could take to align  
legal entities and business lines.97 In one example, the application of 
LER criteria to a current business line only triggered the need for 
additional research by management, instead of a weighing of obstacles 
and vulnerabilities associated with resolution that the business line 
presented.98 A better way to show that LER criteria are clear and 
actionable, in the Agencies’ view, would have been to include examples 
of how the criteria could be applied in a way that would facilitate 
resolution, a showing that the current alignment is resolvable under the 
 
 
90. WELLS FARGO & CO., 2016 RESOLUTION PLAN PUBLIC SECTION 13 (2016), https:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/wells-fargo-2g-20161001.pdf. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 14. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. See Letter from Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & the F.D.I.C to 
Timothy Sloan, Chief Exec. Officer and President of Wells Fargo & Co., 1 (Dec. 13, 2016) 
[hereinafter, WF Dec. 2016 Letter] (“[T]he Agencies have jointly determined that the 2016 
Submission does not adequately remedy the deficiencies related to LER Criteria . . . .”). 
97. See id. (discussing the inadequacies of the assessment framework). 
98. Id. at 4. 
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bank’s current strategy, or analysis of how the criteria mitigate risks to 
orderly resolution.99 
Wells Fargo is the first company to be penalized due to living 
will deficiencies.100 The bank is currently forbidden from establishing 
foreign banks or foreign branches and acquiring any nonbanking 
subsidiaries.101 Further, if the deficiencies are  not  cured  by  March 
2017, then Wells Fargo’s nonbank entity and broker-dealer total asset 
size will be limited to the level reported in September 2016.102 The Fed 
decided to restrict activities three months after its investigation into 
illegal banking practices perpetrated by Wells Fargo employees began, 
although the Agencies insist that the sanctions were unrelated to the 
firm’s sham-accounts fraud.103 Nonetheless, it is difficult to reconcile 
this credibility determination in light of the progress Wells Fargo has 
made toward simplifying its structure and operations. 
Evaluating the propriety of the Agencies’ decision is  
challenging for several reasons. First, as the GAO espoused in its report 
on the living will process, the Agencies and the banks refuse to disclose 
much detail to the public about the contents of the living wills.104 As a 
result, a balanced assessment of Wells Fargo’s—or any covered 
company’s—progress year after year is not possible, and the public 
must rely on the Agencies to report this information.105 Second, even 
increased disclosure may not provide the means necessary to evaluate 
progress because many living wills are said to be over 10,000 pages 
 
 
 
99. See id. at 5–6 (listing ways that Wells Fargo could have demonstrated that the LER 
criteria it developed would be clear and actionable during resolution). 
100. Ryan Tracy, Wells Fargo Sanctioned by U.S. Regulators for ‘Living Will’ 
Deficiencies, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-regulators- 
sanction-wells-fargo-declaring-living-will-deficiencies-1481664744. 
101. WF Dec. 2016 Letter, supra note 96, at 9. 
102. WF Dec. 2016 Letter, supra note 96, at 10. 
103. See Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening 
Accounts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/business/ 
dealbook/wells-fargo-fined-for-years-of-harm-to-customers.html (reporting that Wells  
Fargo employees engaged in illegal banking practices that involved opening nearly two 
million fraudulent banking and credit card accounts without customer consent). 
104. See JARQUE & PRICE, supra note 59, at 4 (reporting that the banks decide what to 
include in the public sections of the living wills and that the level of disclosure has been 
minimal). 
105. See JARQUE & PRICE, supra note 59, at 4 (“[M]aintaining confidentiality must be 
weighed against the need for a meaningful level of disclosure about the firm’s ability to be 
resolved without assistance.”). 
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long.106 Third, the Agencies have not disclosed their framework for 
assessing deficiencies to covered companies or the public, which is 
necessary to determine whether the credibility determinations are made 
using objective criteria.107 Despite these gaps in information, the 
publicly available documents that report the progress made by Wells 
Fargo and other covered companies depict an industry that is investing 
substantial resources to remedy the complexity inherent with TBTF.108 
 
III. HOW LEGAL ENTITY RATIONALIZATION REMEDIES COMPLEXITY OF 
LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
A. LER Addresses Structural Complexity 
 
Many of the complications caused by disorderly resolution of 
large firms stem from the vast number of legal entities in their corporate 
structures, which make it difficult to organize and consolidate legal 
proceedings.109 Cautionary examples of such difficulties abound in 
various accounts of the largest corporate failures in U.S. history, the 
most notable of which is the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings 
(“Lehman”).110 When Lehman filed for bankruptcy in September 2008, 
there were over 400 subsidiaries111 in more than  forty  jurisdictions 
under the company’s structure.112 The structure of material entities— 
likely driven by tax, accounting, and regulatory advantages without 
regard to resolution considerations113—led to seventy-five different 
bankruptcy proceedings114 with some actions occurring concurrently on 
 
106. See JACOPO CARMASSI & RICHARD J. HERRING, CORPORATE STRUCTURES, 
TRANSPARENCY AND RESOLVABILITY OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS  160 
(Aug. 2014) (“Many documents submitted are reported to exceed ten thousand pages in 
length . . . . “). 
107. See GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 27 (reporting that the Agencies have not 
disclosed frameworks to plan filers or to the public). 
108. See e.g., WELLS FARGO & CO., supra note 90, at 13 (detailing formation of internal 
living will oversight office in addition to consultation with external resolution experts). 
109. JARQUE & PRICE, supra note 55, at 13. 
110. INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION, supra note 18, at 19. 
111. INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION, supra note 18, at 211. 
112. Nizan Pakin, The Case Against Dodd-Frank Act’s Living Wills Contingency 
Planning Following the Financial Crisis, 9 BERKELEY BUSINESS L.J. 29, 81 (2014). 
113. See CARMASSI & HERRING, supra note 106, at 153 (explaining why global 
institutions adopt complex legal structures without regard for possible obstacles to orderly 
resolution). 
114. CARMASSI & HERRING, supra note 106, at 153. 
  
 
2017] RESOLUTION PLANS ADDRESS TBTF 371 
three continents.115 
Citigroup is substantially larger and more globally active than 
Lehman.116 However, the living will process, and more specifically the 
LER requirement, has prompted Citigroup to streamline its operations 
and downsize where possible to mitigate obstacles that would otherwise 
impede resolution.117 For instance, after identifying core business lines, 
critical operations, and material entities, Citigroup sold non-core 
business lines and subsidiaries and divested assets in various domestic 
and foreign businesses.118 Although Citigroup has retained a substantial 
number of entities, LER has improved the way that the firm organizes 
and manages those entities by bringing recovery and resolution to the 
forefront of corporate activity.119 This trend holds true to varying 
degrees for all eight of the covered companies. 
Despite the costly efforts undertaken by TBTF firms to reduce 
complexity, Richard Fisher, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas, in a statement to the U.S. House of Representatives, asserted  
that these institutions are still too complex and impervious for the living 
will to have any effect on the resolution of a failed firm.120 This 
contention has some merit because the arrangement of legal entities can 
complicate bankruptcy proceedings considerably.121   Clearly, Lehman 
 
 
115. Jonathan Macey, Are Any Creditors “Particularly Deserving”?: On the Enduring 
Attraction of the Ring-Fence Approach to Cross-Border Insolvencies of Fin. Institutions, 31 
YALE J. ON REG. 695, 709 (2014). 
116. Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator, Donnelly, Warren Encourage Fed, 
FDIC to Consider All Statutory Tools if Banks’ Living Wills Are Found Not Credible (June 
20, 2016), https://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1162. 
117. CITIGROUP INC., OCTOBER SUBMISSION PUBLIC SECTION 22 (2016), https:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/citigroup-1g-20161001.pdf (detailing 
efforts undertaken by Citigroup to streamline its organization). 
118. See id. at 22 (listing non-core business lines that were sold, including one consumer 
lending company, resulting in a 70% reduction in non-core assets). 
119. Id. 
120. See Richard W. Fisher, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Dallas, Statement before 
the Comm. on Fin. Servs.: Correcting ‘Dodd-Frank’ to Actually End ‘Too Big to Fail’ 9 
(June 26, 2013), https://www.dallasfed.org/news/speeches/fisher/2013/fs130626.aspx 
(“Given the complexity and opacity of the TBTF institutions and the ability to move assets 
and liabilities across subsidiaries and affiliates . . . a living will would likely be ineffective 
when it really mattered.”). 
121. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-707, BANKRUPTCY: COMPLEX 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION POSE CHALLENGES 28 (2011), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11707.pdf (reporting that complex institutions are difficult 
to resolve through bankruptcy proceedings in part because of their incongruent legal 
structures). 
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expanded its organization with little regard for how legal entities could 
be resolved in the event of bankruptcy.122 In most instances, the legal 
entities did not align with the operational structure of the company, 
making it difficult to map interconnections among  subsidiaries.123  
Many core business lines were scattered across multiple subsidiaries 
because of the haphazard structure of  material  entities.124  
Consequently, as each subsidiary was sold to a new owner, the company 
lost access to information necessary to appraise and liquidate assets.125 
In a situation like Lehman’s, where the corporate structure was 
already in disarray when it failed, a living will may not have any 
discernible effect on the resolution process.126 However, achieving 
credibility under the living will requirement mandates that the banks 
engage in LER by identifying a resolution strategy and reorganizing 
their organization to coincide with that strategy.127 Therefore, in the 
event that a covered company does fail, the living will shall provide a 
map of the organization’s material entities, core business lines, and 
critical operations, as well as a separability strategy to enable rapid 
liquidation of assets.128 Further, the information in the living wills 
provides the Agencies with ongoing insight into the unique operations  
of each firm and enables them to disseminate targeted feedback to 
improve resolvability.129 
 
B. LER Addresses Financial and Operational Complexity 
 
When the parent holding company of an organization becomes 
 
 
122. Richard Herring & Jacopo Carmassi, The Corporate Structure of International 
Financial Conglomerates: Complexity and its Implications for Safety and Soundness, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING 196, 225 (Allen N. Berger et al. eds., 2012). 
123. Stephen J. Lubben & Sara Pei Woo, Reconceptualizing Lehman, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
297, 303–04 (2014). 
124. GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 38. 
125. GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 38. 
126. MICHAEL FLEMING & ASANI SARKAR, THE FAILURE RESOLUTION OF LEHMAN 
BROTHERS 188 (2014), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/2014/ 
1412flem.pdf (highlighting the delays caused by the organizational complexity of Lehman 
which made it difficult to identify which Lehman subsidiaries creditors had claims against). 
127. GUIDANCE 2017, supra note 28, at 10. 
128. GUIDANCE 2017, supra note 28, at 19. 
129. See JARQUE & PRICE, supra note 55, at 6 (concluding that increased understanding 
of the characteristics of each individual firm is one way to reduce the risk of  future 
bailouts). 
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financially and operationally interconnected with its material entities, 
separating the failing holding company from its solvent subsidiaries for 
resolution becomes difficult.130 For example, Lehman’s  parent 
company, Lehman Brothers Holdings, functioned by lending operating 
funds to its subsidiaries at the start of each day and collecting the cash   
at the end of each day.131 On September 15, 2008, Lehman filed for 
bankruptcy before funding its material entities, tying much of its cash  
up in bankruptcy and preventing its affiliates from sustaining critical 
operations.132 
To reduce financial and operational complexity that might 
otherwise obstruct an orderly resolution, the Fed adopted a final rule 
that requires large banks to adhere to a set of operating limitations  
called clean holding company requirements.133 The clean holding 
company requirements limit the ability of parent holding companies to 
enter into certain financial arrangements with subsidiaries that may 
complicate resolution.134 The regulation prohibits: (1) bank holding 
companies from acquiring third-party debt instruments with an original 
maturity of less than one year; (2) guaranteeing subsidiary debt if doing 
so would result in the holding company’s insolvency;  and  (3) 
organizing upstream guarantees which occur when subsidiaries 
guarantee holding company debt.135 
The clean holding company requirements embody some of the 
goals of LER in that each restraint serves to reduce the operational 
complexity of a large financial institution and thereby prevent the 
contagion effects that exacerbated the financial crisis.136 Requiring a 
minimum of one year for third-party debt instrument maturity mitigates 
 
130. See Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, F.D.I.C., A Progress Report on the Resolution 
of Systemically Important Financial Institutions (May 12, 2015), https://www.fdic.gov/ 
news/news/speeches/spmay1215.html (“The inability to resolve one legal entity without 
causing knock-on effects that may propel the failure of other legal entities within the firm 
makes the orderly resolution . . . extremely problematic.”). 
131. Herring & Carmassi, supra note 122, at 225. 
132. Herring & Carmassi, supra note 122, at 225. 
133. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., TLAC and Clean 
Holding Company Requirements Finalized (Dec. 15, 2016) https://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/press/bcreg/20161215a.htm. 
134. SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 25. 
135. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, Long-Term Debt, and Clean Holding Company 
Requirements, 80 Fed. Reg. 74926, 74944 (Nov. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
217 and 252). 
136. Id. 
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risks of funding runs, asset fire sales, and runs on other large financial 
institutions.137 By limiting upstream guarantees, the holding company 
will be allowed to fail while its solvent subsidiaries continue to operate, 
ensuring continuity of shared services through resolution.138 Finally, 
limiting the activity of the bank holding company creates a simplified 
legal and operational structure which supports orderly resolution.139 
While striving to satisfy the LER requirement and the clean 
holding company requirements, covered companies have simplified  
their operations from the top-tier holding company downward.140 
Overall, the firms have substantially reduced their total number of 
entities and restructured their organizations.141 For example, Bank of 
New York Mellon is in the process of moving its Indian subsidiary 
under its main bank;142 Goldman Sachs separated its operating entities 
from its investing entities;143 and Morgan Stanley separated its 
investment management business from its institutional broker-dealer.144 
Further, all eight of the nation’s largest banks are operating in 
accordance with the clean holding company rule, even though 
compliance is not due until January 2019.145 This demonstrates that the 
banks are making strides toward addressing the complexity inherent in 
TBTF institutions.146 Going forward, the Fed should refrain from 
imposing more prudential requirements on the banks. 
 
IV. STRINGENT PRUDENTIAL REQUIREMENTS SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED 
 
A. Prudential Requirements Generally 
 
While the nation’s complex financial institutions have become 
larger  since  the  crisis,  the  living  wills  process  has  made  them less 
 
 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. See, e.g., MS 2016 Letter, supra note 80, at 5 (noting the adjustments made in 
ownership structure). 
141. Citigroup 2016 Letter, supra note 81, at 4. 
142. BNYM 2016 Letter, supra note 16, at 5. 
143. GS 2016 Letter, supra note 54, at 5. 
144. MS 2016 Letter, supra note 80, at 5. 
145. BNYM 2015 Letter, supra note 16, at 10. 
146. INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION, supra note 18, at 238. 
  
 
2017] RESOLUTION PLANS ADDRESS TBTF 375 
vulnerable to financial distress.147 Further, each living will review cycle 
has provided information that is being used to mitigate obstacles to an 
orderly resolution in the event of  financial  distress.148  Despite  this, 
many are calling for the Fed to impose more stringent prudential 
requirements149 on banks that fail to resolve deficiencies in their  plans  
in the next submission cycle.150 Though the threat of stricter prudential 
restraints provides a strong incentive for banks to comply  with  the 
living will requirement, the enforcement of any one of these measures 
could have negative impacts that extend beyond the covered company’s 
operations.151 
The Fed and the FDIC set out the process used to impose 
additional prudential standards when a covered company fails to submit 
a credible living will.152 First, if a covered company submits a plan that 
is deemed deficient by the Agencies, that company has ninety days to 
resubmit an updated plan that adequately addresses the deficiencies.153 
Next, if the Agencies jointly determine that the revisions do not remedy 
the deficiencies, then the covered company or any of its subsidiaries 
may be subjected to “more stringent capital, leverage, or liquidity 
requirements or restrictions on growth, activities, or operations.”154 
Finally, if after two years the covered company still has not 
submitted a credible plan, the Agencies may direct the company to 
divest certain assets or operations.155  This illustrates the powerful tools 
 
147. SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 13 (“While large bank holding companies 
have become larger, they are less vulnerable to financial distress since the enactment of the 
Dodd-Frank Act.”). 
148.   80 Fed. Reg. 74926, 74928 (Nov. 1, 2015) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 and 
252). 
149. This note focuses on strict prudential standards that may be imposed as a result of 
deficiencies in living wills. See Failure to Cure Deficiencies on Resubmission of a 
Resolution Plan, 12 C.F.R. 243.6 (2016). However, U.S. banks are already subject to 
enhanced prudential standards including mandatory capital planning, periodic stress testing, 
and establishment of risk management standards. See Press release, Bd. of Governors of the 
Fed. Reserve Sys., Final Rule to Strengthen Supervision and Regulation of Large Bank 
Holding Companies (Feb. 14, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/ 
bcreg/20140218a.htm. 
150. Warren Press Release, supra note 13. 
151. See e.g., Sarin & Summers, supra note 19 (manuscript at 15) (discussing the 
corresponding relationship between increased capital requirements and increased market 
volatility). 
152. Resolution Plans, 12 C.F.R. § 243.6. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
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that the Fed has at its disposal to intervene when it is appropriate to do 
so. However, the use of any one of these tools could impact market 
volatility and the economy.156 Therefore, regulators should only use 
additional prudential requirements when the benefits of imposing the 
restrictions outweigh the costs to market stability. 
 
B. Impacts of Restrictions on Capital, Leverage, and Liquidity 
Limits 
 
Capital, leverage, and liquidity measures are indicators of the 
health of a financial institution and can be used to increase the safety  
and soundness of that institution.157 Likewise, maintaining optimal 
capital and liquidity while carefully monitoring leverage will help banks 
weather financial crises.158 Because of  this,  regulators  carefully 
supervise these metrics and take enforcement actions when these 
measures indicate that the bank is at risk for insolvency.159 Early 
corrective action could prevent bank failure and thus prevent harm to 
the market.160 
Despite these advantages, regulatory action such as stringent 
capital and liquidity minimums against a solvent bank increases market 
volatility.161 For example, excessive  capital  requirements  could 
decrease investor confidence in the soundness of the bank and thereby 
lower  the  franchise  value  of  that  institution.162     This  is  because 
 
156. See e.g., Sarin & Summers, supra note 19 (manuscript at 27) (suggesting that 
market volatility may have increased because of greater regulatory uncertainty). 
157. See e.g., CITIGROUP, CITIGROUP INC. RESOLUTION PLAN PUBLIC SECTION, 15 (July 
1, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/citigroup-1g- 
20150701.pdf (detailing actions taken to maintain capital and liquidity levels vital to the 
successful execution of resolution strategy). 
158. SR 14-8, supra note 27, at 3. 
159. SR 14-8, supra note 27, at 3. 
160. SR 14-8, supra note 27, at 3. 
161. See Sarin & Summers, supra note 19, (manuscript at 34). In this report, Natasha 
Sarin of the Harvard University Department of Economics and Lawrence Summer of the 
JFK School of Government at Harvard conclude that the franchise value of banks, measured 
by the ratio of price to book value and the ratio of the market value of equity to assets, has 
declined since the financial crisis. The report asserts that “part of the reason for declines in 
franchise value is regulatory activity and the prospect of future regulation” and that “[t]here 
is a possibility that by further eroding bank franchise value, further regulatory actions could 
actually increase systemic risk.” 
162. See INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION, supra note 18, at 110 (explaining how 
government policy during the 2008 crisis exacerbated the financial crisis because concern 
about the health of the banks increased after the announcement of the TARP program). 
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government intervention causes concerns about the health of large 
financial institutions.163 Further, increased capital requirements would 
require the bank to forego investments that would yield profit for their 
investors and benefit the market.164 Not surprisingly, economists have 
observed that “a large part of the reason for declines in franchise value  
is regulatory activity and the prospect of future regulation.”165 
 
C. Impacts of Restrictions on Growth, Activities, Operations 
 
It makes sense to limit the growth of an institution that is 
considered TBTF, because many regard size as the most significant risk 
associated with banks.166 One of the concerns is that a bank that is  
TBTF will be too large to be sold in the event of financial distress.167 
However, the enforcement of growth limitations would impair 
significant benefits that large banking firms provide to the market: the 
economies of scale that they possess due to their size, and their ability  
to diversify risks.168 
Banks achieve economies of scale when output can be doubled 
for less than a doubling of cost.169 If these cost savings are jeopardized 
by regulatory limitations on growth, market participants will pay for it 
through higher costs for products and services that banks provide.170 
Further, research shows that size does not have as significant an impact 
on bank safety as much as regulatory supervision which ensures 
continued inspection of bank risk  taking.171  Accordingly,  the  living 
wills process has become an excellent tool for regulatory supervision 
because it provides updated reports containing full disclosure of covered 
companies’ overall operations.172 
 
163. INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION, supra note 18, at 110. 
164. See Pakin, supra note 112, at 61 (explaining how increased capital requirements 
reduces the funds available to borrow for investments). 
165. Sarin & Summers, supra note 19, (manuscript at 34). 
166. JARQUE & PRICE, supra note 59, at 3. 
167. See Pakin, supra note 112, at 91 (asserting that no single entity could purchase a 
failing systemically important financial institution without government support). 
168. SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 9. 
169. SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 9. 
170. SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 9. 
171. SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 13. 
172. See SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 24 (stating that regulators are using 
the living wills mandated by Dodd-Frank to gain understanding of the workings of large 
financial institutions). 
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The most severe of the prudential requirements would require a 
bank to divest assets chosen by the Fed in its discretion.173 While 
directing a financial institution to divest a business line may reduce the 
risk of harm to the economy arising from that company’s failure, 
limiting activities could constrain the institution’s ability to reduce the 
risk of insolvency by diversifying its business lines.174 Large banks  
have the unique capability to diversify risks by investing in 
nontraditional banking activities, which has been shown to decrease the 
risk of contagion.175 Nonetheless, diversification contributes to 
complexity which increases the chances of complications during 
resolution.176 To address this risk, covered companies  must  design 
living wills that apply LER criteria to each new entity and line of 
business to ensure that resolution procedures are at the forefront of 
considerations related to diversifying activities.177 Therefore, it is more 
advantageous to refrain from restricting activities until a covered 
company has had adequate time to restructure its activities according to 
the LER criteria.178 
Limiting the growth of a bank is one way to address the risk 
that, in the event of a failure, the government would be the only entity 
available to purchase remaining assets and bail out the bank.179 
However, LER requires material entities to correspond with business 
lines so that they can be sold in separate, affordable pieces apart from 
 
 
173. Failure to Cure Deficiencies on Resubmission of a Resolution Plan, 12 C.F.R.  
243.6 (2016). 
174. See SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 22 (“The larger the bank, the smaller 
the marginal increase in contagion risk due to diversification into nontraditional banking 
activities, as measured by the noninterest income share.”). 
175. See SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 22. 
176. See SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 26 (“To the extent diversification 
leads to greater organizational complexity, that itself can present additional risks given the 
increased difficulties with resolving complex institutions.”). 
177. See SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 28 (explaining that the living will for  
a company must identify operational interconnection to facilitate rapid transfers or sales of 
legal entities or business lines). 
178. DELOITTE, TACKLING TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL: THE RESOLVABILITY CHALLENGE FOR BANKS 
22 (2016) https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/financial- 
services/deloitte-uk-too-big-to-fail.pdf. 
179. See Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247, 1312 
(2014) (quoting Jim Millstein, former Chief Restricting Officer of the Treasury Department 
who stated: “[t]here are few if any institutions with the balance sheet to support the purchase 
of one of these businesses in good times . . . there is no credible way to break [these firms] 
up and sell them during a crisis”). 
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the bank holding company.180 Requiring covered companies to develop 
plans to recapitalize individual entities and detail steps to continue 
critical operations while each is being sold will aid in the successful 
transfer of these material entities.181 Therefore, the living  will 
requirement serves as a tailored tool to distribute bank assets without 
restricting growth. 
The Agencies require each covered firm to identify triggers that 
signal commencement of resolution activities, such as the escalation of 
information to the company’s board and the raising of capital or  
liquidity before a crisis starts.182 While Lehman was unequipped to 
manage the resolution of its global enterprise during the financial crisis, 
firms that plan responses to a variety of scenarios will be armed with 
necessary information to make better choices regardless of their size.183 
The living will’s LER requirement is effective in this regard because it 
facilitates advance preparation for financial crises by requiring firms to 
plan specific actions in response to a variety of scenarios for each 
material entity, including a separability analysis.184 
Due to the potential impacts on the financial markets and the 
effectiveness of the living will process, the Agencies should only  
restrict bank activities when doing so is absolutely necessary. Strict 
prudential requirements should only be forced upon institutions that 
resist resolution planning and implementation because, as discussed, 
such regulatory action could be costly to the health of the economy. On 
the other hand, firms—like Wells Fargo—that are working diligently 
and that invest resources to create a credible living will should be 
allowed to improve without having additional restraints placed on their 
business activities. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The living will process was designed to be iterative in order to 
facilitate the supervisory goals of the regulation.185   As projected by 
 
180. GUIDANCE 2017, supra note 28. 
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183. See Pakin, supra note 112, at 43 (stating that “preparing recovery plans forces  
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various scholars when the living will requirement was newly enacted, 
the covered companies subject to the regulation have improved their 
daily operations, organizational structure, and information systems as a 
result of the planning process.186 The regulation has been in effect for 
five short years, and the Agencies emphasized that significant changes 
would have to be made before a complex firm could go bankrupt 
without major disruptions to the financial system.187 
The living wills requirement has facilitated a back and forth 
dialogue that allows the Agencies to guide banks’ progress on an 
individual level.188 The feedback from the Agencies guides the covered 
companies in their endeavors to reshape their organization to reduce the 
likelihood that the government will need to assist the firms during 
resolution.189 However, the process is new and both the Agencies and  
the banks are evolving.190 Further, the banks must  invest  in 
sophisticated and costly research and development to meet the standards 
set by the Agencies.191 While stringent prudential requirements may be 
in order for banks that willfully refuse to adhere to the living will 
guidance issued by the Agencies, it is counterproductive to penalize 
covered companies, like Wells Fargo, for failing to meet standards that 
they are striving to satisfy.192 
Some commentators believe that the living wills requirement is 
ineffective because the nation’s largest banks are still TBTF.193 
However, the covered companies have taken many steps to comply with 
the LER requirement which has led to a reduction in complexity and an 
increase in streamlined operations in these organizations.194   The living 
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will requirement is, through an iterative process, making the nation’s 
largest banks simplify their structures to enable separability of entities  
in the event of resolution.195 Thus, the living will process has enabled  
the banks and the Agencies to address the complexity associated with 
resolving a TBTF firm.196 The evidence of  the  effectiveness  of  the 
living will process as it stands counsels against the imposition of more 
stringent prudential requirements on the banks. 
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